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HOW FAR DO THE BORDERS
OF THE WEST EXTEND?
Russian/Polish strategic conflicts
in the period 1990-2010
Twenty years ago, Poland was the biggest satellite of the global Soviet
empire, of which Russia was the core. Today, Poland is Russia’s largest EU
neighbour, and Russia is Poland’s largest non-EU neighbour. The former
border between the People’s Republic of Poland and the USSR has trans-
formed from an intra-bloc ‘line of demarcation’ into a section of the most
important dividing line in Europe. From the perspective of Brussels and
Warsaw, this line runs between the West and the region regarded as its
neighbourhood (containing potential EU members); from Moscow’s per-
spective it separates Russia – along with its sphere of influence – from
the West The history of the border symbolically illustrates the relations
between Poland and Russia over the last twenty years: it is not simply
a story of two countries, but a story entangled in much broader prob-
lems of pan-European significance.
This text summarises the first two decades of the relations between in-
dependent Poland and the Russian Federation. It presents them mainly
through the lens of problematic questions because the most important
areas of the two countries’ mutual relations have been composed of con-
tentious issues. With a longer time perspective, it may be possible to an-
swer questions which have been posed repeatedly since the early 1990s
and which have often been answered rashly and stereotypically: What is
the essence of Polish/Russian problems? Do they stem from historically
conditioned phobias and prejudices, or from genuine contradictions be-
tween the two parties’ interests? And finally, are we ‘treading water ‘ by
engaging in these difficult relations, or is this process bringing a new
quality into the relationship?
O S W 39
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Before looking at these questions, it is worth setting the context by mak-
ing three key points, which are very often overlooked in debates about
the Polish-Russian problems, but which should be borne in mind in order
to understand the dynamics and essence of the interactions between Mos-
cow and Warsaw.
Firstly, the problems of today should not obscure the fact that – when
seen from a historical perspective – the last two decades can almost be
regarded as a ‘golden age’ of Polish-Russian relations. This is the first
time in several centuries that a sovereign Poland and Russia have been
able to develop mutual relations without resorting to force; moreover,
they have established a bilateral legal basis and (albeit not without dif-
ficulty) put into practice its provisions on “the inviolability of borders,
territorial integrity, non-interference with internal affairs and the nations’
right to self-determination”1. Clearly, this situation stems from many fac-
tors, and not just decisions taken by Poland or Russia alone. Nevertheless,
the situation which we currently perceive as difficult and highly unsa-
tisfactory in fact marks a breakthrough, and demonstrates the immense
progress that has been made in Moscow’s policy towards Warsaw and
vice versa.
Secondly, Polish-Russian relations should not be reduced to the purely
intergovernmental level. The undeniably difficult relations at the official
level have had little impact on co-operation between businesses and so-
cial organisations, or on research and cultural exchange. Even if the scope
of this co-operation did shrink in the initial period immediately follow-
ing the break-up of the Soviet empire, this arose mainly from the new
social and economic conditions, and not as a result of problems between
Warsaw and Moscow.
O S W40
1 ‘Poland-Russia. ‘Treaty on friendship and neighbourly relations signed on 22 May 1992
by Presidents Lech Wał´sa and Boris Yeltsin’, in Polska–Rosja. Traktat o przyjaznej i dobro-
sàsiedzkiej współpracy oraz inne dokumenty, PISM, Warsaw 1992, pp. 9-26.
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Thirdly, relations between Poland and Russia are asymmetric. This refers
not only to the obvious and oft-mentioned asymmetry of capabilities,
but also to the different levels of sensitivity that each state shows when
classifying issues as difficult situations or conflicts in international rela-
tions. For Poland, relations with Moscow are among the most conflict-
ridden. For Moscow, which has been involved in numerous economic
and political wars as well as military conflicts in recent years, its prob-
lems with Poland are just one of many issues, and certainly not the most
dramatic one. This asymmetry has weighed heavily on mutual relations
because it has caused the two sides to perceive the same facts differently:
what appears as a deep crisis from the perspective of Warsaw is taken
as political business-as-usual in Moscow. As a result, the two sides have
displayed different levels of determination towards solving the prob-
lems.
O S W 41
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The four problems
In October 1990, the foreign ministers of Poland and the Russian FSSR
met in Moscow and adopted the Declaration on friendship and neighbourly
relations. This document, which was signed before the Soviet Union had
even broken up, marks the symbolic start of new, post-Soviet relations
between Poland and Russia. Since that time, there have been moments
when those mutual relations have been quite cordial; however, the
atmosphere between the two countries has more frequently been chilly
and tense. Top-level visits have been cancelled or cut short on several
occasions; no Russian president visited Poland for nine years consecu-
tively (1993–2002); Moscow has imposed economic sanctions on Poland,
and a number of harsh diplomatic and political exchanges as well as
mutually critical press debates have taken place.
The problems underlying those tensions have always been part of the
same four threads: (1) the dismantling of Russian dominance in Poland
and Warsaw’s policy towards the EU and NATO; (2) the policies pursued
by the two states in relation to the Eastern European countries, (3) ener-
gy relations, and (4) the interpretation of the two nations’ common his-
tory. From the perspective of the last two decades, it appears that these
four long-term processes have constituted the key – and at the same time
the most difficult – areas of mutual relations. Differences on those four
issues have affected other aspects of relations between Moscow and War-
saw, as a result of which apparently insignificant events have on some
occasions risen to the level of serious conflicts. The present paper focuses
on these four processes. A number of other occurrences and bilateral
issues, which have attracted much attention in their time, have been
deliberately omitted as being either secondary to the four fundamental
questions, or incidental and of no consequence for Polish-Russian rela-
tions in the long term.
O S W42
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I. The first problem – the dispute
about the sovereignty of Poland
After 1989, the strategic objective of Poland’s foreign policy, as acknowl-
edged by most Polish decision makers, was to put an end to any signs of
the Soviet, and subsequently Russian dominance in Poland, and to pre-
vent any new forms of dependence from emerging. The intention was
not to act to the detriment of the Russian Federation; this effort was
rather perceived as a sine qua non of the existence of an independent
Polish state. This was the premise voiced very clearly in the opening
address of Poland’s first non-communist prime minister, Tadeusz
Mazowiecki: “We have opened a new chapter in Polish-Russian relations.
They are no longer guided by ideology and shaped by the Communist
party (…), they are now normal relations between states and their gov-
ernments pursuing the good of their nations and their national interests
(…). Our point of reference in our mutual relations is the independence
of the Polish state”2.
It very quickly transpired that this independence would inevitably require
the freedom to choose allies, because in Poland’s geopolitical situation,
neutrality would in fact lead to continued dependence. This is why only
membership in the Euro-Atlantic structures came to signify full military,
political and economic sovereignty for Poland, as it created conditions
for the modernisation of the state and enabled a successful transforma-
tion of the system of government.
However, Poland’s aspirations to independence and its ensuing rappro-
chement with the West were often perceived in Moscow as diminishing
Russia’s influence in Europe and strengthening theWestern ‘camp’. Acting
on this perception, Russia made attempts to restrain Poland’s political
autonomy and impede its integration with Western structures, which in
turn met with objections in Warsaw and raised concerns about a possi-
ble rebirth of the Kremlin’s imperial aspirations. This discrepancy has
O S W 43
2 The Polish prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s address to the Parliament, 12 Septem-
ber 1989, Trybuna Ludu, 19 January 1990.
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been the cause of the most serious frictions between Russia and Poland,
which have recurred at greater or lesser intensity throughout the last
two decades.
In 1989, Prime Minister Mazowiecki obtained a pledge that Russian troops
would be withdrawn from Poland by 1991. However, the pledge was soon
forgotten, as members of the conservative post-Soviet nomenklatura gain-
ed influence in the Kremlin. No progress in the negotiations concerning
the pullout of troops was reported for many months. A breakthrough
came after the August putsch in Moscow. In October 1991, a treaty on the
withdrawal of troops was initialled, and 1993 set as the final deadline
for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Poland. However, the pro-
perty issues remained unresolved. A proposed solution was to create
companies with mixed capital that would take over the property left by
the Northern Group of Forces. The military employed in these companies
would be allowed to reside on the territory of Poland. Initially, the Polish
side agreed to include provisions concerning such companies into the
treaty. However, this solution met very strong criticism from large parts
of the Polish political elite; it was seen as undermining Poland’s sover-
eignty and preserving bridgeheads for Russian political and military pre-
sence on Polish territory. Consequently, during President Lech Wał´sa’s
visit to Moscow shortly before the agreement was signed on 22 May
1992, the Polish side asked for the provisions to be removed.
The new Polish-Russian treaty on bilateral relations was also signed dur-
ing the visit by President Wał´sa to Russia. Work on the document had
started back in 1991. At that time, the parties disagreed about the So-
viet-proposed clause to limit Poland’s ability to enter military alliances
and other pacts without Moscow’s consent. However, the Russian Fede-
ration no longer made any ‘anti-alliance’ demands. Article 1 of the treaty
stated that “the Parties shall develop their relations in the spirit of friend-
ship, neighbourly partnership and equality”3.
O S W44
3 ‘Treaty on friendship and neighbourly relations signed on 22 May 1992 by Presidents
Lech Wał´sa and Boris Yeltsin’, op.cit.
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1. Membership in NATO and military co-operation
with the United States
However, the practical implementation of the treaty’s provisions proved
problematic. A debate about Poland’s accession to NATO was already un-
derway at the time the treaty was signed. Signs of Moscow’s disapproval
of this process started to surface with the creation of the Russian Fede-
ration, and were voiced mainly in military circles. Those statements
gained in intensity in 1993 when the rapprochement between the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland on the one hand, and the North Atlantic
Alliance on the other, became increasingly apparent. In the face of such
attitudes from Russian politicians, the Polish-Russian declaration to the
effect that “in the long term, such a decision by sovereign Poland (i.e.
accession to NATO) would not be contradictory to the interests of other
states, including Russia”4, made during President Boris Yeltsin’s visit to
Warsaw in August 1993, was welcomed all the more enthusiastically in
Poland. However, the declaration was not followed by any change in Rus-
sia’s policy; four weeks later, the Russian president sent a confidential
letter to Western leaders, highlighting the threats involved in the Cen-
tral European countries’ integration with NATO. Russia argued that NATO
enlargement would isolate Russia and adversely affect its relations with
the West, and that good relations between NATO and Russia were much
more important for European security than the Alliance’s good relations
with the Central European countries5.
Similar arguments were also raised in press debates in Russia. It was point-
ed out that NATO enlargement would reinstate bloc politics and push
Russia towards authoritarianism. However, some analysts admitted that
Russia’s internal instability and unpredictability could be the factor
prompting Poland to take such a step. Others maintained that the behav-
iour of the Polish authorities was inappropriate because Warsaw was
facing no threats from either east or west6.
O S W 45
4 Joint declaration by Poland and Russia, in Zbiór Dokumentów, No 3, PISM, Warsaw 1993.
5 The letter was published in A. Rotfeld, ‘Europe: Towards a new regional security regime’,
SIPRI Yearbook 1994.
6 Pushkov, Moskovskie Novosti, 10 October 1993; Arbatov, Segodnya, 16 October 1993.
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This attitude was reflected in the strategic documents Russia published.
Both the Foreign policy concept published by the Russian Ministry of Fo-
reign Affairs in January 1993, and the new military doctrine adopted in
November 1993, included provisions on the “historical interests of Russia”
in the region and on the preservation of the region’s “friendly neutrality”.
The containment of NATO’s enlargement was not limited to the question
of maintaining influence in Central Europe, but was part of Russia’s
wider strategy aimed at establishing a new security architecture in Eu-
rope, which would enable Russia to decide jointly on political and mili-
tary issues while at the same time restraining the US military presence
in Europe.
This was the Russian position as presented by the Russian foreign mini-
ster Andrei Kozyrev in Krakow in February 1994. He called for NATO’s
role to be limited, and for the Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe to be transformed into a leading institution in charge of co-
ordinating security issues in Europe. To the Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians
and Poles, Kozyrev offered “cross-guarantees” of security from the Russian
Federation and the biggest Western states. The proposal was perceived
in Poland as signifying Russia’s refusal to accept Poland’s political eman-
cipation. The Polish authorities tried to persuade Moscow not to view
NATO enlargement as a threat but, on the contrary, as an opportunity for
rapprochement with the Alliance.
In July 1997, the NATO summit in Madrid decided to admit three new
member states including Poland. It should be noted that the decision
was preceded by a number of political measures designed to ‘mitigate’
the cost of this decision for Moscow. From Poland’s point of view, the
crucial measure was the signature in May 1997 of the Founding Act on Mu-
tual Relations, Cooperation and Security between Russia and NATO, which
included inter alia a political commitment to the non-deployment of ma-
jor armed forces on the territories of the new member states (which con-
tinues to be respected to this day)7. At that moment, the question of NATO
enlargement ceased to receive such intense criticism from Russia.
O S W46
7 The text is available at www.nato.int/pfp/nato-rus.htm#texts
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A decade after Poland’s accession to NATO, it is possible to say that the
arguments of both sides have proved to be only partly justified. The enlar-
gement has altered the geopolitical situation in Europe, but it has not ra-
dically changed either NATO’s policy on Russia or Russia’s internal situa-
tion and foreign strategy. While it is true that the new members are more
distrustful of Russia, the enlargement has led neither to a souring of re-
lations (as Russia had predicted), nor to a long-term rapprochement be-
tween the Alliance and Moscow (as Poland had argued it would). The cri-
ses of the last decade have been caused primarily by the divergence be-
tween the two sides’ strategic objectives (e.g. with regard to the Balkans
or Georgia). However, the Kremlin’s predictions have come true on one
point: the new member states, and especially Poland and later the Baltic
states, have turned out to be devoted champions of NATO’s integration
with Ukraine and Georgia, which is completely unacceptable to Russia.
In recent years, US plans to deploy elements of the missile shield in Po-
land have been causing contention. Throughout the Polish/US negotia-
tions (2006–2008), Russia was firmly opposed to the plans and argued that
the shield was in effect an anti-Russian undertaking. Moscow threatened
to retaliate by aiming missiles at the shield elements located in Central
Europe and deploying new-generation short-range missiles in the Kali-
ningrad oblast. Russia’s criticismwas addressed not so much to the United
States as to Poland and the Czech Republic (on whose territories the ra-
dar stations forming part of the system was to be deployed).
Poland emphasised that the shield was a defensive project, the objective
of which was to ensure protection against a possible attack from Iran.
This was evidenced by the technical parameters of the installation, which
could not have provided effective protection from a missile arsenal as po-
werful as the one held by Russia. Poland also emphasised its sovereign
right to conclude bilateral agreements with the United States. It pointed
out that Russia’s objections were indicative of its specific treatment of Cen-
tral Europe, including Poland, as no criticism had been expressed about
the deployment of missile shields in Denmark or the United Kingdom.
In essence, the conflict did not concern the installations themselves, but
was rather a continuation of the strategic dispute about the scope of the
US military presence in Poland and Central Europe, and the Central Eu-
O S W 47
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ropean countries’ right to full sovereignty with regard to hard security.
Russia opposed the permanent deployment of any US forces in the region.
The Polish government, on the other hand, believed that such a presence
would provide an additional security guarantee; i.e. that in the event of
a threat, the USA would be more willing to engage in Poland if that would
in fact mean the defence of its ‘own forces’ on Polish territory.
2. Integration with the European Union
The process of Poland’s integration with the European Union was much
less problematic, although it too gave rise to some controversies. Ini-
tially, the Russians perceived EU enlargement as posing no threat to Rus-
sian interests, in contrast to the enlargement of NATO. This perception
was due to the notion, dating back to Soviet times, that spheres of influ-
ence are defined mainly in terms of military presence. However, as Po-
land’s rapprochement with the EU progressed, Moscow started to pub-
licly raise the issue of the likely adverse consequences for Russia arising
from this. The manner in which the demands were presented and the
harshness of the rhetoric suggested that, apart from mitigating the un-
favourable consequences of the enlargement, Russia was also making
a political statement8. Its aim was to show that despite EU enlargement,
the Russian Federation would not be reduced to a peripheral country but,
on the contrary, the Community would have to respect the interests
of Moscow as an important actor on the continent.
The problem of Kaliningrad turned out to be one of the most important
points of contention. As a result of the EU’s enlargement, the Russian en-
clave would be completely surrounded by EU member states. Even be-
fore the accession of Poland and the Baltic states, the Russian side start-
ed to make harsh references concerning the damaging implications of this
on ties between Kaliningrad and mainland Russia (specifically, the Russian
public’s freedom of movement between the two areas). This caused seri-
O S W48
8 For more information, see Marek Menkiszak, ‘Russia vs. the European Union: a “strate-
gic partnership” crisis’, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, January 2006.
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ous friction, especially between Lithuania and Poland on the one hand,
and Moscow on the other. Lithuania firmly refused to implement any so-
lutions which would impede its accession to the Schengen zone in the
future, and Poland criticised the Russian idea of an extra-territorial cor-
ridor running through its territory. Warsaw also maintained that the tran-
sit route did not run through its territory, and would not run through it
in the future, due to infrastructural reasons. The European Commission
acted as a mediator and a conciliatory force in the dispute. As a result,
a compromise was reached (implemented in June 2003), under which it
was decided that transit would take place solely via Lithuania based on
free and easily accessible permits (the so-called Facilitated Transit Docu-
ment).
The second contentious issue raised concerned the economic consequen-
ces of EU enlargement for Russia. Under the Partnership and Co-operation
Agreement (PCA) governing the EU’s economic relations with Russia, the
new member states were to be automatically covered by that agreement
upon their accession to the Community. However, the process proved to
be rather problematic. Several months before the 2004 enlargement, Rus-
sia started to demand the signature of a statement that would regulate
certain co-operation issues which Moscow deemed sensitive. After lengthy
negotiations, in April 2004 the parties signed a protocol to the PCA and
a statement9. The EU accepted most of Russia’s economic demands but
rejected the proposal to soften or retreat from certain EU standards (such
as sanitary requirements) applicable to goods imported from Russia.
Paradoxically, Poland’s membership in the European Union has proved
to be much more consequential for the overall shape of Russia’s relations
with Poland and the West than has Warsaw’s accession to NATO. Poland’s
membership in the EU has not brought about any breakthrough in the
Community’s policy towards Russia, but has had a significant impact on
the EU’s strategy in a number of areas, including the energy and eastern
O S W 49
9 The agreement finally came into force only after ratification by the State Duma in No-
vember 2004.
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neighbourhood policies (to be discussed in greater detail further in the
text), as well as economic policy.
As for the principles of the EU’s economic co-operation with Russia, War-
saw has taken an active stance in connection with what became known
as the meat crisis. In November 2005, Russia imposed an embargo on
Polish agricultural and animal products, claiming – as its justification for
the move – that there had been instances of certificate forging for such
products. Poland’s economic losses were small (the Polish ministry of eco-
nomy estimated them at around US$300 million a year). However, Warsaw
was convinced that the embargo had been largely politically-motivated,
and that its aims included undermining the EU’s single trade policy and
dividing EU member states into two categories – the ‘better’ ones with
good relations with Russia, and the ‘worse’ ones whose relations with Rus-
sia were tense. In this situation, Poland’s main policy goal was to obtain
the support of the European Commission, i.e. the institution formally in
charge of trade policy issues, and of the other member states, in order
to clearly manifest European solidarity. On 13 November 2006, Poland veto-
ed the European Commission’s mandate to start talks with Russia concern-
ing a new agreement laying down the legal framework of EU-Russia rela-
tions. This forced the EU member states to take note of the embargo
problem and undertake concrete measures towards Moscow.
The EU initially adopted a dual strategy of persuading Poland to withdraw
its veto and Russia to lift its embargo. It was only after Russia toughened
its stance that the EU started to display more solidarity10, most visibly dur-
ing the Russia-EU summit in Samara in May 2007. On that occasion, the
German chancellor Angela Merkel, who was representing the EU presiden-
cy, said that the meat crisis was not a bilateral issue but concerned the
entire Union.
O S W50
10 In order to gain a stronger bargaining position, Russia suggested it might extend its
ban on meat imports to the entire European Union, on the pretext that conditions for
Romania and Bulgaria’s accession to the EU had not been consulted with Russia. In an-
other attempt at dividing the Union, Moscow declared that only states that signed bila-
teral agreements with Russia to guarantee the safety of their products would be allowed
to export meat to Russia after 1 January 2007. Russia offered to sign such agreements
with Germany, Italy, France, Denmark and Ireland.
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The meat embargo was finally lifted between December 2007 and Novem-
ber 2008 (on different dates for different products), i.e. only after political
groups that declared readiness to improve relations with Russia came to
power in Poland in the aftermath of the parliamentary elections. At that
time, Poland also withdrew its veto against the start of negotiations con-
cerning the new Russia-EU agreement.
O S W 51
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II. The second problem – contradictory visions
of neighbourhood
Unlike the process of Poland’s political and military emancipation, and
the rapprochement with NATO and the European Union that it entailed,
the question of Eastern Europe has never been officially identified as an
important area in relations between Russia and Poland. In reality, how-
ever, both sides were aware of their conflicting interests in this sphere.
The tension resulting from this ‘latent’ conflict has been affecting bilat-
eral relations, triggering clashes of an evidently secondary nature. At the
core of the disagreement lay the conflicting visions of the Eastern Euro-
pean order. The future of this region has proved to be of fundamental
significance for both Russia and Poland.
Warsaw’s interests focused mainly on Lithuania, as well as Ukraine and
Belarus, and later Georgia. Lithuania, however, ceased to be regarded as
part of the ‘neighbourhood area’ when it joined the Euro-Atlantic struc-
tures. In Poland, the assumption was that the countries in question should
be sovereign (i.e. free of Russian, Polish or any other dominance) and fol-
low the same path of systemic transformation that Poland had chosen,
namely, to develop democracy and a market economy, and to aim at inte-
gration within the Euro-Atlantic structures.
This vision was the implementation of a concept of fundamental impor-
tance for Polish political thought, which had been formulated long be-
fore the fall of communism by two distinguished émigré journalists, Jerzy
Giedroyç and Juliusz Mieroszewski. This concept stated that the situation
in the Eastern European countries (which the authors referred to as ULB,
an acronym standing for Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus) was of crucial
importance for Russia’s policy towards Poland. Moscow’s control over
those countries would pave the way to the subjugation of Poland, where-
as their sovereignty would contribute to Poland’s independence11.
O S W52
11 ‘Rosyjski ‘kompleks polski’ i obszar ULB’ (‘Russia’s ‘Polish complex’ and the ULB area’),
Kultura 1974, No 9.
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From Russia’s point of view, the character of the political and economic
systems developed by the countries in question was of secondary impor-
tance. The key objective was to preserve political, economic and military
ties between the Eastern European states and Russia that were as strong
as possible; the underlying assumption was that the relationship should
not be that of partners, but should be based on Russian dominance. This
entailed firm objections to those countries’ integration with NATO and
(albeit to a lesser extent) with the European Union. Russia viewed the
emancipation of the CIS members as a threat to its security, and a factor
that would push Moscow to the periphery of Europe.
This way of looking at the post-Soviet states, including those in Eastern
Europe, was reflected in the policy document entitled Russia’s strategy
towards the CIS members, which was approved by presidential decree on
14 September 1995. Section 1 of the document, which describes the ob-
jectives and undertakings of Russia’s policy towards the area, does not
even mention ‘democracy’ or ‘market economy’. Instead, it emphasises
that Russia strives for the political and economic integration of the Com-
monwealth of Independent States, and that this process should be guid-
ed by the principle of safeguarding the interest of the Russian Federation
and “strengthening Russia’s role as the main force shaping the new order
of inter-state relations in the post-Soviet area”12.
Disagreements concerning Eastern Europe have surfaced with varying
levels of intensity over the last two decades. However, the asymmetry
of Poland’s and Russia’s capabilities and instruments for implementing
policy has been evident from the very start of this period. The key actors
were the countries concerned and the Russian Federation. Poland, on the
other hand, played a secondary role, apart from in a couple of specific si-
tuations. Warsaw thus realised very quickly that it would be unable to
support the democratisation of the Central European countries and their
rapprochement with the Euro-Atlantic structures without involving the
Western states in the process. An opportunity for such involvement pre-
O S W 53
12 ‘Strategicheskiy kurs Rosii s gosudarstvami – uchastnikami Sodruzhestva Nezavi-
simykh Gosudarstv’, www.mid.ru
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sented itself when Poland joined NATO and the European Union. Moti-
vated by Poland’s awareness of its own limitations, this strategy of seek-
ing allies was interpreted, wrongly, by some Russian journalists and elite
members as having been inspired, or even ‘ordered’, by Western powers.
Tension related to policies towards Eastern Europe had already become
apparent in 1990. At that time, Poland adopted a ‘dual’ strategy, aimed
at developing dialogue with the Soviet republics while at the same time
maintaining the best possible relations with the Kremlin. The practical
implementation of this concept created dilemmas for the Polish authori-
ties as to which relations should be prioritised. The decisions taken often
amounted to messy compromises. Poland postponed the diplomatic reco-
gnition of Lithuania (it was only the twenty-sixth country to recognise the
state), as Warsaw was concerned about possible complications in its rela-
tions with Moscow. In the case of Ukraine, the Polish authorities adopt-
ed a different stance, and were the first to recognise the Ukrainian state,
even before the Białowie˝a meeting of December 1991 in which the So-
viet Union was dissolved.
In the first years following the break-up of the Soviet Union, Polish-Rus-
sian tensions concerning Eastern Europe were not readily apparent. Rus-
sia was seeking to preserve its dominance in the region. The Russian for-
eign policy concept and the newmilitary doctrine of 1993 contained pro-
visions about “the special responsibility of Russia in the so-called ‘near
abroad’”. In Poland, such signals gave rise to concerns, voiced for instan-
ce by the then foreign minister Andrzej Olechowski: “We are obviously
concerned about statements concerning Russia’s ‘special interests’ or ‘spe-
cial role’ in Ukraine. Such utterances are not conducive to the stability of
Europe. We deeply disapprove of them, and believe that in the long run,
the independence of Ukraine will also contribute to the development of
democracy and the economy in Russia”13. The international atmosphere,
however, was not favourable for Poland’s policy. Most Western states did
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not perceive the Eastern European countries as important actors in Eu-
rope. The dominant approach could be summarised as “Russia above all
and Russia only”, an attitude which in fact put President Yeltsin in the
position of the main guarantor of stability in the post-Soviet area.
Friction between Poland and Russia was exacerbated in the early 2000s
when Poland, freshly admitted to NATO, became a devoted champion of
Lithuania’s accession to the Alliance (Lithuania joined NATO in 2004),
which stood in stark contrast to Moscow’s vision.
The breakthrough came in 2004. Poland had just finalised its integration
process of many years and joined the European Union; Russia, which had
been politically strengthened by the presidential election which ended
in spectacular success for Vladimir Putin, was stepping up efforts to re-
inforce its influence over the CIS. In this setting, a very serious social and
political crisis took place in Ukraine: the opposition (and its candidate
Viktor Yushchenko) accused the then-president of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma,
and the candidate he was promoting, Viktor Yanukovych, of ballot rigging.
In addition, there were many indications that the candidate of the ruling
camp was also being backed by Moscow (the Russian media and politi-
cians had supported Yanukovych). Hundreds of thousands of people took
to the streets throughout Ukraine (and elsewhere) in protest against the
government’s abuse and illegal actions during the election.
For Poland, it was of paramount importance to ensure that the Ukrainian
election met international standards. The assumption was that any other
scenario, especially the use of armed force to resolve the crisis, would un-
dermine Ukraine’s sovereignty and pave the way for Russian dominance,
while at the same time impeding, if not altogether preventing, Kyiv’s co-
operation with the European Union, NATO and the Western states. This
conviction was the motivation behind the involvement of Polish politi-
cians, and especially the then president Aleksander Kwasniewski, in re-
solving the internal crisis in Ukraine. The Polish activities greatly con-
tributed to the organisation of the three round table meetings in Ukraine,
which produced the final compromise and made the repeat of the sec-
ond round of voting possible. In all this, the Polish government strove to
act as a representative of the Union, making a (successful) effort to en-
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sure that the mediation mission was a Community undertaking, and not
simply a national enterprise (the mission included Javier Solana, the EU
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy).
In Russia, Poland’s activities were perceived as anti-Russian and aimed at
creating a Polish sphere of influence. The media spelt out accusations that
the Polish involvement in fact amounted to supporting the pro-Polish
candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. As Sergei Markov, a Russian political scien-
tist involved in Yanukovych’s campaign, framed it, “’Operation Yushchenko’
was part of Poland’s plan to establish itself as the leading state in Cent-
ral and Eastern Europe”14. Markov also emphasised that the objective of
the Poland-endorsed pro-western option in Ukraine was to isolate Russia
and strengthen Poland, because the USA had decided that Ukraine should
join NATO under Poland’s protection15. Gleb Pavlovsky, another political
scientist with close links to the Kremlin, who was working for Yanuko-
vych at that time, also voiced harsh criticism of the ‘Kwasniewski doc-
trine’ which allegedly aimed at “the containment of Moscow’s political
influence”.
The conflict did not directly manifest itself at the diplomatic level. Dur-
ing the Polish foreign minister’s visit to Moscow on 17 December, before
the rerun of the second round of voting, the foreign ministers of Poland
and Russia jointly stated that the Ukrainian nation should elect its pres-
ident independently and without any external interference.
The essence of the dispute was nevertheless revealed by the surprisingly
sincere statement by the Polish president Aleksander Kwasniewski, who
stated, “For any great power [implicitly meaning the USA], Russia with-
out Ukraine is better than Russia with Ukraine”. This provoked an equally
direct response from President Putin who interpreted Kwasniewski’s de-
claration as reflecting an ambition to restrain Russia’s ability to develop




16 Quoted from Adam Eberhardt, ‘Stosunki Polski z Rosjà, Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagra-
nicznej 2006’, PISM, Warsaw 2006.
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The fact that the atmosphere of mutual relations soured as as result
of the controversies surrounding the Orange Revolution bore on a series
of apparently insignificant events that occurred in the course of the fol-
lowing year, and had no connection with the Ukrainian crisis. Those
‘secondary’ crises culminated in the incident of 31 July 2005, in which
three teenage children of Russian diplomats were beaten and robbed by
hooligans in Warsaw. Even though the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
issued a diplomatic note expressing regret, Moscow took the incident
to have been a deliberate anti-Russian action rather than a random act
of hooliganism. An anti-Polish campaign broke out in the Russian media.
Within the week (5–10 August), three Poles were beaten in the streets of
Moscow, including two embassy staff members and one journalist. It is
worth noting that around the same time, the son of the Polish ambassa-
dor was beaten while travelling in Siberia (in an evident act of hooliga-
nism without any political undertones). In order to avoid worsening re-
lations further, the Polish ambassador deliberately hushed up the case17.
In the following years, Poland, now a member of the European Union,
sought to participate actively in the development of the Community’s
policy towards Eastern Europe. These efforts appear to have become in-
creasingly effective as the Polish side has gathered more and more expe-
rience in the maze of internal EU diplomacy. All the Polish initiatives, in-
cluding support for the opposition in Belarus during and after the 2006
presidential election, the unimplemented ‘Eastern Dimension’ concept
proposed by Poland back in 1998, and the more successfully promoted
Eastern Partnership initiative, have been perceived by Russia as running
counter to its interests and designed to reduce its influence in Eastern
Europe. It should nevertheless be noted that despite the evident differ-
ence of views, the Russian and Polish statements concerning the Eastern
Partnership have been much more moderate than in the previous peri-
ods. Poland has been emphasising that this new initiative is politically
neutral, and is focused on the modernisation of the so-called Eastern
neighbourhood countries.
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The question of Eastern Europe’s relations with NATO generates much
more controversy than does EU policy on Eastern Europe. Warsaw has
officially backed the accession of the Baltic States, and subsequently (al-
beit less unequivocally) expressed support for membership for Ukraine
and Georgia. Moscow, on the other hand, perceives the possible mem-
bership of Georgia and Ukraine as an absolutely unacceptable ‘crossing
of the red line’. Russia’s attitude towards Poland’s policy is well illus-
trated by a statement from the Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov in
a 2001 press conference held in Moscow following talks with minister
Władysław Bartoszewski. Asked about the role that Poland could play in
the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance, Ivanov said, “Poland may
play a positive role in building stability and security in Europe if it
speaks against further enlargements”18.
In Warsaw, Russia’s position has been criticised as reflecting Moscow’s
refusal to acknowledge the full sovereignty of Ukraine and Georgia. The
prevalent opinion among Polish journalists and experts is that Moscow
has been so determined to defend its standpoint that it has even been
prepared to resort to the use of force. The Russian-provoked armed con-
flict in Georgia in August 2008, which demonstrated Moscow’s ability to
defend its interests, and at the same time exposed the weakness of the
West as a guarantor of stability in post-Soviet countries aspiring to join
the Alliance, may serve as evidence of this.
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III. The third problem – energy geopolitics
Due to their geopolitical location and infrastructural conditions, Poland
and Russia have considerable potential for mutually beneficial energy
co-operation. It could even be said that they have no choice but to co-
operate19. However, this sphere of mutual relations has generated mas-
sive controversies since the early 1990s.
The level of tension and the relative significance of particular issues has
varied considerably in recent years, reflecting the evolution of Russia’s
strategy on the one hand, and the fluctuating priorities of successive
Polish governments on the other. Some points of contention, however,
have remained fairly constant. Warsaw has mainly been concerned about
the excessive dependence of Poland’s energy sector on Russia. The gene-
ral belief has been that it might facilitate monopolistic practices, leading
to solutions that would be unfavourable to Warsaw; and also that it could
become an instrument of pressure in other areas outside economic rela-
tions. Russia has been interested in maintaining a monopoly on supplies
and gaining maximum control over the energy infrastructure, especially
transit gas pipelines.
It should be noted that Polish-Russian energy relations and the related
disputes have only partially taken place at a strictly bilateral level. Over
the past five years they have largely moved onto the European level and
become part of Russia’s manoeuvres with respect to the EU, as well as Po-
land’s strategy as a member of the European Union.
In the bilateral dimension, the terms of supplying natural gas to Poland
and the closely linked question concerning the construction of a new
transit gas pipeline via Poland have been generating most controversy.
In the early 1990s, it became a priority for Poland to agree on new rules
for the supply of gas to Poland. In the final years of the Soviet Union’s
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existence, the so-called Yamburg agreement (concluded in 1987, and de-
signed to run until 1996) was in force. Under that agreement, Poland
committed itself to carrying out a number of construction and renova-
tion projects in the USSR in return for receiving gas supplies. The sup-
plies issue was soon linked with the construction of a new pipeline to
connect the Yamal fields with customers in Belarus, Poland and Germany.
After lengthy negotiations, an agreement to build a system of gas pipe-
lines for the transit of Russian gas via Polish territory and gas supplies
to Poland was concluded during Boris Yeltsin’s visit to Poland on 25 Au-
gust 1993. The agreement envisaged the construction of two pipeline
branches with a total capacity of around 62 billion m3. In September 1993,
the Ministry of Industry and Trade approved the status of the EuRoPol
Gaz company, which was tasked with the construction and operation of
the Polish section of the Yamal gas pipeline. Contrary to the provisions
of the agreement, under which shares in the undertaking were to be
divided between Gazprom and Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo
(PGNiG) in equal proportions, 4% of the shares were taken by Gas-Trad-
ing, a company with mixed Polish and Russian, private and state-owned
capital. In 1995, the prime ministers of Poland and Russia signed an annex
to the 1993 agreement concerning organisational arrangements to en-
sure the implementation of the agreement, and in September 1996, the
CEOs of PGNiG and Gazprom finally concluded a 25-year deal for the sup-
plies of 250 billion m3, which was worth US$21 billion according to the
Russian side. The agreement concerning the construction of the gas pipe-
line has only partially been implemented, as only the first branch has
been built. It was completed in 1999, and reached its full capacity of 32.3
billion m3 in 2005.
From its inception, the Yamal agreement has been a source of controversy,
not only in Poland, but also between Warsaw and Moscow. The contro-
versy concerned the ownership of EuRoPol Gaz, which in practice allow-
ed Gazprom to take over control of that company as the Russian mono-
poly was informally co-operating with the private shareholder of Gas-
Trading, thus gaining de facto control of the company, and consequently
of the entire EuRoPol Gaz. Such an arrangement was regarded in Poland
as being contradictory to Poland’s interest. The assumption was that the
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Polish side should control the Yamal gas pipeline and the entire strate-
gic gas transmission infrastructure. Charges were even brought against
the Polish officials who had authorised the EuRoPol Gaz’s ownership
structure described above, but the case was dropped because the deci-
sion to award 4% of shares to Gaz-Trading was found to have been legal.
Paradoxically, the question of the Yamal gas pipeline’s ownership was
raised again on the initiative of the Russians during PM Putin’s visit to
Poland in 2009. This time, it was the Russian head of government who
was calling for the controversial company to be ousted from EuRoPol
Gaz. The reason was probably that co-operation with Gaz-Trading was
no longer profitable for Gazprom at this stage, and ousting the private
owner would enable the Russian monopoly to slightly increase its share-
holding in EuRoPol Gaz.
The second controversy involving the Yamal project concerned the wider
problem of diversifying gas supplies to Poland. In 1993, an internal debate
began in Poland about whether the Yamal agreement would ensure
Poland’s energy security by safeguarding long-term supplies and balancing
Poland’s dependence on energy resource supplies from Russia with Rus-
sia’s dependence on transit via Polish territory, or whether it would seal
Gazprom’s monopoly and hinder any diversification initiatives for many
years. This dilemma was one of the main challenges of Warsaw’s energy
policy towards Moscow. The strategy of successive Polish governments
was inconsistent and full of about-turns. In 2001, when the post-Solida-
rity AWS/UW coalition was in power, a preliminary agreement was signed
with Norway to import 5 billion m3 of gas a year from 2012. The follow-
ing government, dominated by post-communist groups, decided not to
implement that agreement. Supplies from Norway were prioritised again
under the right-wing government of Law and Justice, only to become of
secondary importance for the next centre-right PO/PSL cabinet. This gov-
ernment, which is currently in power, has sought to extend the Yamal
agreement to 2037 and to increase the annual volume of supplies pro-
vided for in that deal by 20-30%. Meanwhile, Russia’s stance on the issue
has remained clear; the Russian Federation is interested in maintaining
a monopoly and limiting alternative supplies to the Polish market.
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The diversification issue is related to another challenge – the mounting
problems concerning the security of gas supplies to Poland. These prob-
lems are mainly connected with the repeated reductions in the volume
of gas transmitted from Russia, caused by Russia’s conflicts with the
transit states – Ukraine and Belarus. Another factor undermining the
Polish side’s confidence in Russia as a gas supplier is the fact that Gaz-
prom has used its position as a monopoly to force PGNiG to co-operate
with a less-than-reliable intermediary, RosUkrEnergo. Purporting to be
an independent supplier of gas under short-term contracts (around 2.5
billion m3 a year), the company made the extension of PGNiG’s deal con-
ditional on a modification of the terms of the Yamal contract in favour
of Gazprom in 2006, and in early 2009 discontinued supplies altogether,
failing to honour the contract that was in force until 1 January 2010.
Since its accession to the EU, Poland has also been engaged in the wider
debate on the European Union’s energy policy. This process has coincided
with more active approach from Moscow towards the European Union.
For example, Russia has stepped up measures aimed at gaining access in
member states to the end consumer, and has started to promote new gas
pipeline projects running partly through EU territory. As a result, many
proposals presented by Warsaw on EU energy policy have in fact been
reactions to the policies of Moscow, and most of them run counter to the
interests of Gazprom.
Poland’s main objectives in the EU have been:
to protect the liberalising EU energy market from investments by the
Russian gas monopoly which, due to its combined production and trans-
port potential, could gain an advantage over the other players and pose
a threat both to the functioning of the developing market, and to the
energy security of individual countries;
to obtain the European Union’s support for infrastructural projects
conducive to the diversification of gas and oil supplies to Central and
Eastern Europe, that is, projects which would offer EU market access to
energy resource suppliers other than Russia. The main project promoted
by Poland in this context has been the Odessa-Brody-Gdansk oil pipeline,
which was intended to supply Caspian oil (mainly from Azerbaijan) to
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Ukraine and Poland, and possibly to other countries in Central Europe
(Germany, Slovakia, Lithuania);
to stop any undertakings that would deepen the European Union’s
dependence on supplies from the Russian Federation, and to halt Russian
investments in the EU energy sector;
to call for Russia’s reliance on the transit countries, including non-EU
countries such as Ukraine and Belarus, to be maintained.
The last two objectives are the basis of Warsaw’s objections to the Mos-
cow-promoted project of the northern gas pipeline from Russia to Ger-
many under the Baltic Sea. From Moscow’s point of view, the investment
would enable Russia to avoid troublesome transit – especially via Ukraine
or Belarus, but also Poland – and make it possible to supply the key cus-
tomer –Germany directly. From Warsaw’s point of view, the new trans-
port route would undermine the position of the transit countries in their
relations with Russia, and limit the ability of the entire Union, including
Poland, to seek any natural gas suppliers alternative to Gazprom.
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IV. The fourth problem – history
as a political instrument
The dispute about history has undoubtedly been one of those aspects of
mutual relations which clearly extend beyond the sphere of bilateral re-
lations. On the one hand, it has been part of each country’s wider efforts
to define its international position, and on the other, has been deeply
entangled in internal affairs. However, the significance of this dispute
(in the international and domestic spheres) has been completely differ-
ent for Poland and Russia.
For Russia, historical disagreements with Poland have been just a small
element of a wider process whereby the Russian Federation has been
defining its new, post-Soviet identity through its past history. Over the
last ten years, this identity has increasingly come to be built around Rus-
sia’s great power aspirations, referring to the achievements of the Soviet
Union. This is why the Russian authorities have been rejecting those ele-
ments of the past which undermine the image of the Soviet Union as
a constructive global power. The Kremlin has usually considered dis-
agreements about historical issues to be harmless; such conflict situations
have often provided the Russian ruling elite with a convenient instru-
ment to mobilise the public around a new ‘Great Russian’ idea of statehood.
For Poland, the historical controversies with Russia have been important
in their own right, in particular as another area of emancipation from
the dominance of the former empire. This has been the reason for the
particularly emotional attitude towards the question of clarifying and
publicising facts concerning Soviet acts of violence against the Polish
state and nation, which have had to remain silenced or minimised for
years. For most Polish politicians, these conflicts are a problem, a solu-
tion to which would be highly desirable. However, it is also true that the
conflict has been the object of internal political bargaining within Po-
land much more often than in Russia.
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The controversies that arose during the negotiations concerning the
Polish/Russian treaty in 1992 can be regarded as the symbolic beginning
of the historical problems. Warsaw wanted the document to include sta-
tements on Stalinist crimes and on indemnities for Polish nationals who
had been victims of the regime. The Russian authorities firmly refused.
In subsequent years, the Polish side has regularly called for the issue to
be resolved through an interstate agreement, but without any results.
Over time, the intensity of Warsaw’s efforts lessened, even though the
question of indemnities still formally figures in the list of unresolved bi-
lateral issues. The Russian authorities have consistently claimed that these
matters are covered by Russia’s domestic legislation under which Polish
nationals, too, may claim compensation. However, obtaining an indem-
nity in this way would be impossible in most cases, as the repression vic-
tims have not received any verdicts from the courts, and are therefore
ineligible to claim any compensation.
The other legal issue in bilateral relations, and one of much greater signi-
ficance for the Polish side, concerns the final clarification of the Katyn
case. In the early 1990s, the Russian authorities made a number of ges-
tures in this direction. In 1990, the Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev
handed President Wojciech Jaruzelski some documents from NKVD files
concerning the Polish prisoners and covering the years 1939–1940. In
1992, Boris Yeltsin declassified files demonstrating the responsibility of
the highest Soviet authorities for the Katyn crime and handed them over
to the Polish side. A year later, he placed a wreath under the Katyn cross
in the Warsaw Powàzki cemetery, the first Russian leader to do so. How-
ever, contrary to what is widely believed in Poland, no official apology
was presented on that occasion. According to eyewitnesses20, the Russian
president whispered, “Prostite, yesli smozhete” (“Forgive, if you can”) when
laying the wreath.
The work of exhumation was conducted around the same time, and the
military cemeteries in Kharkiv, Katyn and Mednoye were established by
the end of the decade and opened in 2000. Serious disagreements oc-
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curred only in 2004, when the Military Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian
Federation decided to close the Katyn investigation opened back in 1990.
Contrary to Poland’s expectations, the crime was not recognised as ge-
nocide, and 116 out of the 183 volumes of files were classified. Moscow
also refused to rehabilitate the victims of the Katyn murder, claiming
that this was not possible because they had not been convicted under
a court verdict. Poland has repeatedly raised these issues, especially the
question of the declassification of files, but they remain unresolved.
The disagreements described here have been closely connected with
a much wider debate about symbols and national prestige, which con-
cerns the origins, outbreak and consequences of World War II. This de-
bate has been catalysed mainly by successive anniversaries and prepa-
rations to commemorate them.
The first major clashes related to anniversary celebrations took place in
1994 and 1995. Lech Wał´sa did not go to Moscow to commemorate the
fiftieth anniversary of the victory over fascism (Poland was represented
there by the PM Józef Oleksy), and Boris Yeltsin was absent from Katyn
during the commemoration of the 55th anniversary of the massacre.
Among other matters, the disagreements concerned the interpretation
of the significance of the end of the war. According to Lech Wał´sa, it
marked the beginning of a new occupation in Eastern Europe, but this
interpretation offended Russia. The Russians also claimed that the Poles
were diminishing the historical role of both the Soviet soldiers and the
Polish soldiers who fought side by side with them.
A particular souring of ‘anniversary relations’ occurred in 2004–2005, in
connection with the sixtieth anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, the
65th anniversary of the Katyn murder, and the outbreak of World War II,
all celebrated in Warsaw, as well as the sixtieth anniversary of the vic-
tory over fascism, celebrated in Moscow. It started with a very heated
and emotional exchange in the media. After much hesitation, President
Aleksander Kwasniewski finally decided to take part in the Moscow cele-
brations. However, the behaviour of the Russian officials in connection
with his visit was interpreted in Poland as a deliberate blow to Warsaw’s
prestige; for instance, President Putin made no mention of the contribu-
O S W66
poza_seria_1_pl_ang:PUNKT_WIDZENIA_15_caly  3/9/10  5:36 PM  Page 66
tion Polish forces made to the victory. As Poland could not present its
position in Moscow, the Polish foreign minister Adam Rotfeld communi-
cated it to the international community in his address at a special meet-
ing of the UN General Assembly convened to commemorate the anniver-
sary of the victory21.
Poland and Russia subscribe to different interpretations of the role of the
Soviet Union in starting the war. The Polish side emphasises the joint
responsibility of the Soviet Union and highlights its co-operation with
Nazi Germany (through the Ribbentrop–Molotov pact, for example),
while Russia deeply resents the equating of Soviet totalitarianism with
that of the Nazis. The two sides also differ about the Yalta conference:
the Poles underline its significance as the symbol of the final division of
Europe into spheres of influence, whereas the Russians claims that this
is a misinterpretation of the outcome of the conference, which “reassert-
ed the desire to make Poland strong, free, independent and democratic”
(the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has even released a special state-
ment concerning the issue22).
The seventieth anniversary of the outbreak of World War II, celebrated
in Poland, has also inspired heightened emotions on both sides. The Rus-
sian PM Vladimir Putin attended the ceremony; in his statement, and in
an article published shortly before by Gazeta Wyborcza, he condemned
the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, but at the same time he noted that it had
been preceded by the “treaty with Hitler, which undid any hopes for a joint
front against Hitler”, signed by France and Great Britain in Munich23. He
also expressed sympathy for Polish sensitivity about the Katyn case. How-
ever, the moderate message formulated by Putin in Poland was accom-
panied in Russia by a number of very strong official and media state-
ments in the spirit of Soviet historiography. It could be argued that these
messages were at least tolerated, if not inspired, by the authorities – the
fact that the most potent materials included two documentary films
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broadcast by state-owned television may serve as evidence of this24. The
documentaries alleged that the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact was a neces-
sary measure to protect the Soviet Union against a German attack. They
presented Poland as collaborating with Hitler in the 1930s, with a view
to attacking the USSR.
It should be noted that neither Russia’s official position nor the message
of the Russian media in the run-up to the seventieth anniversary of the
outbreak of World War II were focused exclusively on Poland. They were
part of a broader effort to promote a certain concept of the origin of
World War II, which the Russian authorities have been endorsing for the
last several years. According to this concept, responsibility for the out-
break of the war rests with other countries apart from Germany, includ-
ing France, Great Britain and Poland, which struck compromises or col-
laborated with Hitler, thus contributing to the strengthening of Ger-
many on the one hand, and a marginalisation of the anti-fascist Soviet
Union on the other. In this interpretation, the Soviet Union was obliged
to start talks with Hitler as a preventative measure.
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Two decades of difficult relations
The experience of the last twenty years leads to some interesting conclu-
sions, which seem to undermine some of the established ways of think-
ing about Polish-Russian relations.
1. First of all, the frequently repeated view that the Polish-Russian con-
flicts stem mainly from genetic Russophobia on the Polish side, or irra-
tional prejudice on the Russian side, appears to be unfounded. The un-
derlying causes of the Polish-Russian problems are real and concern stra-
tegic issues. At the deepest level, this is a dispute about how far the West-
ern world’s borders extend, and about the Russian Federation’s sphere of
influence. The disagreement affects many levels. It pertains to historical-
ly defined identities, economic assets and the political sphere. Obviously,
it does not involve Poland and Russia alone. Moreover, Poland is certainly
not the most important actor in this regard, although due to the histori-
cal context and its geographic location it is one of the countries that lies
closest to the ‘line of contact’, and is therefore particularly entangled in
the disagreement.
2. Secondly, facts do not bear out the opinion that all the fundamental pro-
blems between Poland and Russia remain unresolved. On the contrary,
the most important contentious issue of recent years, the question of Po-
land’s emancipation and its integration with the Euro-Atlantic community,
can in fact be considered resolved. This demonstrates that Polish-Russian
friction should not be viewed as unproductive disagreements, but rather
as a difficult process which nevertheless takes the two countries forward.
3. The manner in which the dispute about Poland’s sovereignty was re-
solved demonstrates that solving strategic problems does not require the
two sides’ foreign policy priorities to be brought closer together. When
the question of Poland’s Euro-Atlantic integration was being decided,
Russia stepped up its ‘great power’ rhetoric. However, after Poland’s
accession to NATO and the EU – that is, when the situation had become
fully clear – both sides adjusted their positions to the new realities with-
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in a couple of years. It could be argued that tension subsided when the
‘zone of uncertainty’ shrank. Moscow came to accept Warsaw’s political
emancipation, and Poland gradually softened its stance towards its east-
ern neighbour, while also meeting the expectations of its western part-
ners who were more disposed to conciliation.
4. The same pattern has been observed in connection with the other, still
unresolved, dispute concerning the contradictory visions of the future of
Eastern Europe. In previous years, the problem gained intensity when-
ever uncertainty arose as to which direction the Eastern European coun-
tries would take, such as during the Orange Revolution, or when NATO
was deciding whether to award Membership Action Plans to Georgia and
Ukraine. This observation has interesting implications for the future of
the dispute. Assuming that neither Russia nor Poland, and more broadly
the European Union, are likely to redefine their interests, it can be pre-
dicted that uncertainty (the two-vector strategies pursued by the coun-
tries concerned, the ambiguous strategies of the EU and NATO) will only
add fuel to the dispute. Decisive policies, on the other hand, may heat
up the conflict at the breakthrough point, but in the longer term may
bring about a solution.
5. The dynamics of Polish-Russian relations in the last two decades have
shown that the relations between Warsaw and Moscow do not have to
be in permanent crisis. The political climate has improved on several oc-
casions since 1990. However, the periods of better relations were usual-
ly not occasioned by real changes, but rather by redefined tactics, as a re-
sult of which the problems were both perceived and presented less in-
tensely. This observation shows that political decisions to approach the
mutual disagreements in a less confrontational manner (both in Poland
and in Russia) may improve the atmosphere. However, it is also true that
these periods of rapprochement have always been followed by new break-
downs. It appears that such fluctuations should also be expected in the
next few years, for it would be an illusion to believe that serious dis-
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putes can truly be solved just by changing the form. And disagreements
about the future of Eastern Europe, as well as the interpretations of his-
tory and energy security, certainly continue to be serious disputes.
6. Contrary to expectations, it was not only Poland’s membership in NATO
(about which the fiercest battles have been fought), but also its accession
to the European Union that has had a crucial impact on Polish-Russian
relations. This refers not only to the frequently underlined developmen-
tal changes which have increased the distance between Poland and Rus-
sia in terms of legal, political, social and economic systems, but also the
much less frequently noted linkages between Poland’s policy within the
Union and relations between Warsaw and Moscow. By becoming a EU
member, Poland has gained additional capabilities to build up relations
with the Russian Federation, with Brussels as Poland’s go-between and
supporter. Paradoxically, Poland’s integration with the EU has also expand-
ed the range of instruments available to Russia, which the Polish side had
not predicted. The quality of relations with Russia has become a factor
that could either buttress or undermine the reliability of Warsaw and its
representatives on the EU’s internal scene. The experience of the last five
years shows that this co-dependence may generate two kinds of effects.
On one hand, it may stimulate the two states’ determination to maintain
good relations by restraining their confrontational rhetoric (in order to
avoid being labelled as irrationally Russophobic in the case of Warsaw, and
in order to prevent Poland from taking ‘anti-Russian’ actions within the
EU, in the case of Moscow). On the other hand, it may trigger an escala-
tion of the conflict if it becomes used instrumentally: by Russia to discre-
dit Poland in the European Union in order to create divisions within the
Community, or by Poland to unite the EU in opposition against Russia.
Katarzyna Pełczyƒska-Nał´cz
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